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MexicoWhat is the impact on voting behavior of strengthening property rights over agricultural land? To answer this
question, we use the 14-year nationwide rollout of Mexico's land certiﬁcation program (Procede) and match
affected communities (ejidos) before and after the change in property rights with voting outcomes in corre-
sponding electoral sections across six federal election cycles. We ﬁnd that, in accordance with the investor
class theory, granting complete property rights induced a conservative shift toward the pro-market party
equal to 6.8 percent of its average share of votes over the period. This shift was strongest where vested interests
created larger expectedbeneﬁts frommarket-orientedpolicies as opposed to public-transfer policies.Wealsoﬁnd
that beneﬁciaries failed to reciprocate through votes for the benefactor party. We conclude that, in the Mexican
experience, engaging in a land reform that strengthened individual property rights over agricultural land was
politically advantageous for the right-wing party.
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It is well recognized in economics that complete property rights are
the cornerstone of efﬁcient land use (Demsetz, 1967; Goldstein and
Udry, 2008; Platteau, 2000).1 A large literature on land reform has
shown the importance for agricultural growth and ruralwelfare of prop-
erty rights that offer security of access to land and incentives to invest in
agriculture (Deininger et al., 2004). In spite of this, it is surprising to ob-
serve that property rights over agricultural land remain so pervasively
incomplete. Land reform programs that ambitiously redistributed land
and altered property rights frequently granted incomplete property
rights to beneﬁciaries (Albertus, 2010). And incomplete property rights,
once assigned, are rarely subsequently transformed into complete rights
(Albertus andMenaldo, 2010). This creates amajor puzzle in the ﬁeld of
land reform.Why is land reform so vastly ill-used as a policy instrumentMookherjee and Jean-Philippe
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nce for this.
l rights reserved.in spite of its well-recognized potential to generate efﬁciency and wel-
fare gains (Lipton, 2009)?
The political economy literature addressing this puzzle has identiﬁed
adverse political fallouts as the main reason why incomplete property
rights remain (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Montgomery, 1984;
Warriner, 1969).2 Yet, this proposition has not been submitted to rigor-
ous hypothesis testing, and the channels through which this happens
have not been empirically validated. Rarely do we have the possibility
of identifying a causal relationship between property rights and electoral
behavior. This is an opportunity offered by using as a natural experiment
the 1992Mexican land reform that provided certiﬁcates of ownership to
individualswhopreviously had access to land but faced a variety of prop-
erty right limitations. In the Mexican case, incomplete property rights
granted by the ﬁrst phase of land reform gave beneﬁciaries usufruct of
a plot for individual use and access rights to lands held in common prop-
erty. In both cases, land could not be sold, rented, or collateralized, and
access could be arbitrarily revoked for individuals. Property rights were
incomplete because they did not give beneﬁciaries full rights to extract,2 Recently, Fergusson (2013) has provided an alternative explanation: Politically
powerful landowners choose weak property rights for small landowners to impoverish
them and force them to work for low wages. Although possible in other contexts, in
Mexico this was not the case as the large rural landed elites were against the original
land reform because of the expropriations it entailed for them.
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rights (Ostrom, 1990).
In Mexico, the autocratic government that emerged from the 1910
revolution implemented over the 1914–1992 period a sweeping land
reform that assigned land under highly incomplete property rights to
3.5 million rural households over more than half of the country's terri-
tory. While successful in its land redistribution objective, this form of
property rights increasingly led to agricultural stagnation and extensive
rural poverty. In 1992, in the face of imminent economic competition
with food imports due to NAFTA, the Constitution was amended to
bring land redistribution to an end and initiate a transition to complete
property rights for already awarded land. This was implemented under
a certiﬁcation program, Procede (Program for the Certiﬁcation of Ejido
Rights and Titling of Urban Plots), that was rolled out over a 14-year
period between 1993 and 2006. The national rollout gives us a credible
identiﬁcation strategy to measure the changes in electoral behavior in-
duced by the change in property rights, provided the timing of certiﬁca-
tion is uncorrelated with pre-program changes in voting patterns.
Crucially, our estimates refer speciﬁcally to the effect of strengthening
property rights and are not confounded with effects due to changes in
access to land.
For the empirical analysis, we use the extensive administrative
data from the certiﬁcation program, matched with electoral outcomes
over six successive elections for Federal Congress held every three
years before and after the certiﬁcation process.
Twobodies of theory have beenproposed to explain changes in voting
behavior derived from shifts in property rights regimes. The ﬁrst is the in-
vestor class or vested interest theory which argues that acquiring owner-
ship of productive assets induces a shift to the right because asset-owning
individuals prefer politicians that aremore pro-market, championing low
taxes on capital and labor income and relying less on state intervention
(Nadler, 2000; Richardson, 2010). A logical implication of this theory is
that the shift to the right should be greater the larger the value of the
asset acquired and themore its use value is determined bymarket forces
as opposed to state interventions (Crano, 1997). Duca and Saving (2008)
provide support for this theory by showing that stock ownership in-
duced middle-income Americans to support pro-capital politicians.
Earle et al. (1997) argue that privatizations that extensively distributed
assets contributed to the election of a conservative prime minister and
of a center-right pro-free market party in the Czech Republic. Biais
and Perotti (2002) and Jones et al. (1999) note that politicians can un-
derprice assets during privatizations to induce support for their policies.
While reviewing this literature, Kaustia and Torstila (2008) note that
well-identiﬁed causal analyses of this regularity are still largelymissing.
An exception is Di Tella et al. (2007), who analyzed a natural experi-
ment in Argentina where some squatters received titles on invaded
lands while others did not. They ﬁnd that those with property rights
acquired beliefs supportive of free markets, such as becoming more
materialistic, individualistic, meritocratic, and trustful. In this paper, we
expand on this body of work by providing evidence for agricultural land-
owners instead of ﬁnancial asset/urban land owners, and by analyzing
actual voting behavior instead of beliefs.
The second body of work predicting changes in voting behavior
after a property rights reform is known as distributive politics theory.
It argues that political parties offer material incentives to individuals
who reciprocate with their votes (Dixit and Londregan, 1996). Transfers
can be awarded before the election (Stokes, 2009) or ex-post, when pol-
iticians allocate transfers to reward loyalty (Cox and McCubbins, 1986;
Verdier and Snyder, 2002). In both cases, transfers are expected to induce
voter reciprocity through electoral support. Recently, Finan and Schechter
(2012) have highlighted the role that reciprocity plays in voters' decision
making.
When compared to other directedbeneﬁts, distributive politics theory
argues that voter support is easier to elicit under a recurring short-term
private beneﬁt with threat of non-renewal, for example jobs, fertilizer
subsidies, or loans. This literature suggests that an irreversible beneﬁtsuch as a certiﬁcate of ownership is less likely to elicit voter response.
In support of this difference, a study of voters' responses to beneﬁts
from development programs in West Bengal by Bardhan et al. (2008)
ﬁnds that there was strong response to short-term beneﬁt programs
but not to infrastructure beneﬁts nor tomore substantial one-time bene-
ﬁts such as receiving a land title.
Our results show that granting certiﬁcates of land ownership oc-
curred at considerable political cost for the ruling pro-state party,
with beneﬁciaries swinging to the right in support of the competing
pro-market party. Certiﬁcation induced a shift in favor of the right
wing party by 1.5 percentage points, or 6.8% of the average vote
share of 21.4% over the whole period. We also show that the shift to
the right was stronger in regions with more valuable land, consistent
with the idea that the shift to the right is increasing in the value of the
asset. Finally, we ﬁnd no evidence of beneﬁciaries reciprocating with
votes for the party that awarded the certiﬁcate.
Our results are consistent with the political science literature
which argues that a carefully crafted political equilibrium that had
kept the ruling party in power for over seventy years (Diaz-Cayeros
et al., 2003) was based to a signiﬁcant extent on electoral support
from the large peasant population that was dependent on state support
to link to the market and delivered votes in reciprocity. The closing
down of parastatals and development banks servicing the ejido sector
as a consequence of the ﬁscal adjustment of the late 1980s broke
down that dosed support political equilibrium and was followed by
the gradual implementation of the complete property rights reform
we study.
We draw from the analysis the generic lesson that it is difﬁcult for
an incumbent party that is not to the right of the political spectrum to
beneﬁt politically from property rights reform. This result has omi-
nous implications for left-leaning governments that may be tempted
to engage in property rights reforms in search of efﬁciency gains but
for whom the political consequences may be negative.
We interpret the result as identifying a clear shift to the right as
individual property rights were strengthened. However, this should
not be interpreted as the only reason why limited property rights
may be consciously adopted. An alternative non-political hypothesis
contributing to the choice of an incomplete property rights regime
is that governments may seek to limit rural–urban migration by
tying labor to the land. We explore this hypothesis in another paper
(de Janvry et al., 2013), but note that although certiﬁcation can have a
migration response, for our current purposes we only require that
changes in political preferences andmigration be uncorrelated.We pro-
vide supporting evidence for this in the robustness checks section.
In what follows, we retrace in Section 2 the history of land reform
in Mexico and describe the certiﬁcation program. In Section 3, we ex-
plain how the data were constructed, and analyze the rollout of
Procede in Section 4. We then present results in Section 5. Section 6
veriﬁes that the shift in voting behavior was not due to selection as-
sociated with migration and presents tests supporting the validity of
the identiﬁcation strategy. Section 7 concludes.
2. Land reform in Mexico
Like most of Latin America, the Mexican land reform initially
granted access to land under decidedly incomplete property rights.
In a second phase, it transformed incomplete into complete property
rights, permitting an analysis of the political response to the regime
shift.
2.1. The ﬁrst land reform (1914)
Access to land in Mexico was constructed over a turbulent and
often violent series of events. Under the colonial regime, land was
grabbed from the native indigenous communities by an elite that con-
centrated the land in large estates. While agriculture was booming at
218 A. de Janvry et al. / Journal of Development Economics 110 (2014) 216–225the turn of the XXth century under the Porﬁriato regime (Haber et al.,
2003), extreme conditions of poverty and inequality fueled the revo-
lution of 1910 that was, symptomatically, led by peasant leaders. The
settlement between revolutionary peasants and the other victorious
factions was Mexico's ﬁrst land reform legislated in 1914 and
enshrined in the current Constitution enacted in 1917.
This ﬁrst land reform was to be one of the largest in the world
(Lamartine Yates, 1981). Under the reform, the landed elite was gradu-
ally expropriated and unclaimed lands covering 52% of the Mexican
territory, no less than 103 million hectares, were reallocated to some
32,000 ejido (agrarian) communities composed of 3.5 million families.
While themost active period for land redistributionwas under President
Lazaro Cardenas between 1934 and 1940, expropriations continued
through 1992.3
Land in ejidos belonged to three categories: individual parcels for
farming held in usufruct (right to use), common property lands for
grazing and forestry, and household residential plots. Property rights
over land parcels were permanently insecure and notably incomplete:
the state regulated behavior (prohibiting land transactions, the hiring of
labor, and leaving the land idle for twoyears ormore, aswell as restricting
to only one descendant the inheritance of ejido rights) and mediated
access to the market for individual farmers through parastatals4(for the
purchase of inputs, access to credit, crop insurance, and sale of amarketed
surplus).
Ejido members were also tightly controlled politically. They were
associated in corporatist organizations (the National Confederation
of Peasants) controlled by the ruling party that managed the relation
between farmers and the state. The ejido's political bosses were
expected to deliver the community's vote as a block in support of the
ruling party, the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party), with economic
support frompublic institutions coming in reciprocity for political loyalty
(Larreguy, 2012).
Over time, the 1914 land reform model increasingly showed its
economic limitations. Incomplete property rights and the associated
constraints on behavior and state dependence contributed to stagnant
productivity. Magaloni et al. (2008) argue that the economic inefﬁcien-
cieswere a conscious cost paid in order to establish a reliable clientelistic
relationship between ejidatarios and the state that delivered an impor-
tant voting block in exchange for dosed economic support. With adjust-
ment policies introduced in response to the debt crisis, the late 1980s
saw a stark withdrawal of economic support to the ejido sector which
eroded this political equilibrium.
As Mexico was negotiating a free trade agreement with the Unit-
ed States and Canada (NAFTA) in the early 1990's, the technocratic
elite—then recently ascended to power within PRI ranks—realized
that fundamental changes would have to be introduced in the Mex-
ican agricultural sector to improve its competitiveness. According to
NAFTA negotiations, import tariffs on all agricultural goods would be
completely eliminated within 15 years. As it became imperative for the
Mexican agricultural sector to prepare for competition with its trading
partners, improving property rights in the ejido sectorwas seen as essen-
tial for this purpose. The technocratic wing of the PRI, a group more
concerned with efﬁciency than political control, used the overwhelming
PRI majority in the Mexican congress to amend the constitution in
1992, bringing to an end the ﬂagship land redistribution program and in-
troducing a fundamental change in property rights within the ejido that
came to be known as the second land reform.
2.2. The second land reform (1992)
Theoverarching objective of the second land reformwas to strength-
en individual property rights in the ejido sector.5Its most important3 See Sanderson (1984) for a historical account of the expropriation and reallocation
process.
4 See Gordillo et al. (1998).
5 See De Ita (2006) for a detailed description of the legal changes.aspects were to: (1) end the 75-year long land redistribution program;
(2) establish a national program to provide ejidatarios with certiﬁcates
of ownership over their land parcels, the Procede program (Program
for the Certiﬁcation of Rights to Ejido Lands); (3) give ejidatarios with
certiﬁcates the right to rent their plots to willing parties, sell them to
other members of the ejido, as well as hire in labor and fallow land;
(4) provide a mechanism through which ejidatarios could vote to turn
all or part of the ejido certiﬁcates into full private property, thereby
allowing unrestricted sales to non-ejidatarios and mortgaging of the
land; and (5) create a national rural land registry that could track subse-
quent changes in ownership (de Janvry et al., 1997). Certiﬁcates thus
gave full freedom for individuals to directly relate tomarkets as opposed
to doing this through control of the ejido assembly and the government
(de Janvry et al., 2000).
Procede was rolled out nationwide over the 1992–2006 period
during which it certiﬁed 92% of the ejidos. A small program was left
in place in 2006 to certify the 2500 ejidos where this had not been
done by the ofﬁcial end of the program, due in particular to armed
conﬂict.
2.3. The certiﬁcation process
Procede was organized as a federal government multiagency effort
tasked with establishing boundaries for the ejido as a whole and for
individual land parcels and with issuing certiﬁcates of property rights
(World Bank, 2001). A dedicated ofﬁce was opened in every Mexican
state, and worked with human resources from INEGI (Mexican Statisti-
cal and Geographical Agency), RAN (National Agrarian Land Registry),
PA (Agrarian Attorney's Ofﬁce), and the SRA (Land Reform Secretariat
within the Ministry of Agriculture). Unlike other titling efforts, in
which beneﬁciary demand is paramount (Alston et al., 1996), the
Procede certiﬁcation process was very much a top-down Federal pro-
gram with limited discretion for ejidatarios. While ejidos were at ﬁrst
distrustful of the program, interviews with programmanagers revealed
that ejidatarios quickly realized that the certiﬁcate facilitated proof of
ownership for Federal Government programs, at which point resistance
all but disappeared.
The certiﬁcation procedure6 formally began when an Information
Assembly of the ejido was summoned and in which a simple majority
vote was taken to allow the program to measure the ejido and create
a contour map with subdivisions. Ejidatarios then cooperated with
INEGI to measure individual plots and determine whom they belonged
to. INEGI's measurement effort produced a map of the ejido with the
names of the beneﬁciaries of all individually tilled parcels, common
land shares, and residential housing plots. Mapswere publicly displayed
for a month and conﬂicts resolved through the Agrarian Attorney's
Ofﬁce. With a completed map, a ﬁnal ejido assembly was summoned
to vote on the agreement to partition the land, with a supermajority
required for approval. The authorized map was then sent to RAN to
issue certiﬁcates of ownership to every stakeholder in the community.
Certiﬁcates were then awarded simultaneously for the whole ejido in a
political event. The President often participated in handing out the
certiﬁcates along with local elected ofﬁcials. In terms of political behav-
ior, and the gains to be expected from a pro-market versus a pro-state
political party, certiﬁcates and titles should thus either be equivalent
or certiﬁcates should provide a lower bound of the political response
from full titles.
3. Data
Dates of Procede assemblies in ejidos as well as records of legal
conﬂicts ﬁled during the certiﬁcation process were obtained from6 Appendini (2002) provides a thorough description of the certiﬁcation process.
7 The average municipality has 45,000 people, while electoral sections have around
2000 voters.
8 The minor parties control an insigniﬁcant share of the vote.
9 Land reform communities are mostly ejidos, but a small percentage refers to pre-
colonial indigenous communities. In this analysis of political responses to certiﬁcation,
we only consider ejidos. Property rights in indigenous communities are granted to the
community as a whole, not to individual members, leaving to the community the role
of individual land assignment and the ﬂexibility of re-assignment as community mem-
bership changes. Political responses to Procede are consequently not comparable to
those induced by ejido certiﬁcation.
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information on land certiﬁcation is based on Phina (Historical Census
of Agrarian Communities) and was obtained from RAN. In March
2010, records were available for 29,221 ejidos. We matched Phina
records to the assembly dates ﬁle with a success rate of 97%. RAN pro-
vided geocoded contour maps of all ejidos certiﬁed until 2007. This
allowed us to geographically match the ejidos to the 2000 locality-
level population census data. Census data provide the GIS reference
of the centroid of each locality, and information on age structure,
education, housing conditions, employment structure, and access to
public services. A census locality was matched to an ejido if its centroid
was inside the ejido contour. For ejidoswithout locality, we assigned the
nearest locality not in another ejido.We should note that this geograph-
ical matching is not perfect. Whereas an ejido is deﬁned by a land area
and a deﬁned population of members, the census information corre-
sponds to a population settlement (or locality). While in most cases
the living quarters of ejido members are geographically inside the
ejido, it is possible that all or some ejidatarios live in a locality situated
outside the ejido perimeter, mixed with non-ejido population. It is also
possible that non ejidatario-related population live in localities within
the ejido (especially in urban areas, see Gonzalez-Navarro, 2009).
These data sources provide a database for 24,663 ejidos used in the anal-
ysis of the program rollout.
Voting data at the polling station level were obtained from the
Mexican Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). We use results from Federal
Congress elections which are held every three years from 1994 to
2009 in a simplemajority election system. Every other election, congres-
sional elections are held jointly with presidential ones. This gives us six
electoral cycles beginning in 1994 (year of the presidential electionwon
by Zedillo from PRI), 1997, 2000 (year of the presidential election won
by Fox from PAN), 2003, 2006 (year of the presidential election won
by Calderon from PAN), and 2009. There are 300 congressional districts
subdivided into 65,000 electoral sections.
We focus on legislative elections because they occur every three
years instead of every six for presidential ones, providing twice as
many observations. Furthermore, compared to presidential ormunicipal
voting, legislative elections are ruled to a larger extent by party prefer-
ences rather than by personal attributes of the candidates because infor-
mation and electoral campaigns are much less salient for congressmen
than for presidents.
The Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) provided geo-referenced
electoral section maps for the whole country. The section is the
most disaggregated electoral unit, and consists of a regular shape
containing the homes of around 2000 registered voters. We only
use geographically consistent electoral sections over time for the
analysis.
To match ejidos, localities, and electoral sections, we ﬁrst associate
electoral sections with localities that have their centroid inside the
electoral section contour. We then discard all electoral sections
and associated localities with a large discrepancy between the num-
ber of adults of voting age (18 and above) in the localities and the
number of registered voters. This is to avoid poor matches that
will attribute large towns to the (small) electoral section lying at
the centroid, or reciprocally assigning a single very small locality
to an electoral section when the centroid of the main locality is
located outside the border of the section. Each locality is then asso-
ciated to the ejido it lies inside of. Ejido characteristics, notably
whether it is certiﬁed or not at any particular date, is attributed to
the locality.
Because the dependent variable is vote share at the electoral section
level, we construct population-weighted average characteristics at the
section level from localities inside a given section. Locality weights are
given by the population of voting age in each locality. The key indepen-
dent variable in the analysis is the share of the population in the section
that has been certiﬁed by Procede in any particular year. It is time vary-
ing and ranges between 0 and 1.Finally, for the rollout analysis, we use electoral results from the 1991
congressional election, which took place before initiation of Procede.
The 1991 electoral results are only spatially identiﬁed at the municipal
level, which consists of many electoral sections.74. Technocracy and clientelism in the Procede rollout
There are threemajor political parties inMexico8: the PRI, the tradi-
tional autocratic party that remained in power for over 70 years win-
ning the presidency for the 1988–1994 and 1994–2000 period; the
PRD that split out of the PRI, positioning itself to the left, but never
won the presidency; and the PAN, the pro-market conservative party,
that gained control of the presidency for the ﬁrst time in 2000–2006,
and again in 2006–2012. There were 78 million registered voters in
2009.
Descriptive statistics on ejidos are given in Table 1.9 We group vari-
ables into four categories: (1) ejido size and endowment (such as total
area, land in agricultural parcels and commonproperty area, and number
of members and non-members), (2) locality level economic opportuni-
ties (distance to a city, employment structure, education, poverty as
measured by the marginality index and number of persons per room),
(3) conﬂicts (legal disputes in the ejido), and (4) baseline politics (shares
of municipal votes received by the political parties in the 1991 congres-
sional elections, and incidence of alignment between municipal mayor
and state governor, in the last Federal election before the Procede
rollout).
While the rollout of the Procede process over the 1993–2006 period
progressed simultaneously in all states, it responded within each state
to different administrative supply side and demand-driven forces. We
can establish which were the main variables associated with the date
atwhich RAN held the ﬁrst information assembly, initiating the Procede
process. Results in Table 2 show that the progressive deployment of
Procede reached ejidos in response to the following criteria:
(1) Certiﬁcation difﬁculty, treating ﬁrst ejidos of smaller size, with less
members (ejidatarios), less presence of landed non-member
households (posesionarios), and less conﬂicts.
(2) Higher demand, as seen by the earlier consideration of ejidos with
more of their land in privately cultivated parcels rather than com-
mon property, closer to a city, and where the population is more
engaged in non-agricultural activities and is more educated. These
supply and demand considerations both resulted in a clear bias
against the poorest ejidos, as revealed by the higher marginality
index of localities treated later.
(3) Political forces. In the early 1990s, Mexico was still largely dom-
inated by PRI. As seen in Table 1, it received 69% of the votes in
the 1991 Federal congressional election and had the highest
share in 97% of municipalities. There is however variation in
the vote share received by PRI, with an inter-quartile range of
20 percentage points, and similarly of 13 and 10 percentage
points for PAN and PRD, respectively. At that time 28 of the 31
governors were from PRI, so party alignment between the mu-
nicipality and governor parties occurred for 87.4% of the ejidos.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for ejidos.
Mean St. dev. Median 25th percentile 75th percentile
Procede
Date of ﬁrst assembly May-96 October-94 October-93 November-97
Duration of Procede process (months) 24.1 27.4 13.0 7.0 30
Ejido size and endowments
Total area (ha) 2855 10,876 966 387 2491
Parcel area (ha) 950 5086 399 109 945
Common area (ha) 1784 8936 105 0 1018
Ejidatarios 92.6 134.3 56 31 106
Posesionarios 20.7 87.4 0 0 6
Avecindados 17.2 98.1 0 0 0
Area per member (ha) 37.8 140.4 13.6 6.7 30
Creation date 1950 21 1940 1935 1967
Number of members at creation 81 109 49 30 88
Locality economic opportunities
Distance to city with 25,000 inhabitants (kms) 34.9 29.9 26.8 13.9 46.7
Active population as share of labor force 0.42 0.12 0.42 0.35 0.48
Share of occupied population in agriculture 0.35 0.26 0.30 0.14 0.54
Share of population with superior education 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02
Share of population with high school 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.003 0.06
Marginality index1 −0.23 0.88 −0.28 −0.89 0.40
Average persons per room 2.4 0.9 2.0 2.0 3.0
Conﬂicts
Legal disputes 29.4 50.6 14.0 5.0 33.0
Politics — 1991 federal deputies elections results at municipality level
PRI share 0.690 0.134 0.698 0.595 0.782
PAN share 0.096 0.105 0.049 0.018 0.148
PRD share 0.081 0.111 0.036 0.008 0.107
PRI wins 0.967 0.180 1.0 1.0 1.0
Municipal mayor aligned with governor 0.874 0.332 1.0 1.0 1.0
1 The marginality index is an aggregate of a variety of social indicators collected from the census information largely used in Mexico to measure poverty. This index is a normalized
Z-score ranging between−3 and 3 standard deviations that correspond to very low and very high marginality respectively.
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Procede are reported in columns 5 to 7 of Table 2. Surprisingly, the
PRI vote share in 1991 is not predictive of the Procede start date,
while both higher PAN share and alignment between the parties of
the municipality and the state government are associated with earlier
start dates. A confounding factor is that almost all the municipalities
with the highest PAN shares are also where elections were contested
(deﬁned as those with a difference between the two parties equal to
less than 30% of the votes). Column 6 reports this alternative speciﬁ-
cation, showing Procede ﬁrst assemblies to be 2.8 months earlier in
municipalities with contested elections. This association however
disappears as soon as we introduce distance to the nearest city or
all the other control variables (column 7). The only political variable
that remains robust to adding other factors is alignment between
the parties of the municipality and the state government. We inter-
pret this as coordination costs delaying program implementation.
While this analysis exhibits the association or inﬂuence of both
technocratic characteristics and political factors on the rollout, what
is key to the identiﬁcation in the analysis of Section 5 is that early
certiﬁcation should not be associated with a differential trend, not
level, in voting pattern. In other words, we can only use the rollout
of Procede as a natural experiment to identify the impact of acquiring
property rights on changes in political behavior if the timing of certif-
icate issuance to particular ejidos is not correlated with changes in
political behavior. To verify this, we proceed in Section 6.2 to different
tests of exogeneity of the rollout relative to our variable of interest:
changes in party vote shares. There we show that the change in
municipal vote share between 1991–1994 for PRI or PAN does not
predict the date of program rollout. We also show that changes in
PRI or PAN shares pre-program at the electoral section level are
uncorrelated to date of assembly or certiﬁcation.5. Impact of certiﬁcation on voting behavior
5.1. Evidence of a shift to the right
We now analyze the prediction of the investor class theory
according to which asset ownership induces a conservative shift to
the right in voting behavior. The unit of analysis is the electoral section,
and the dependent variable is the share of votes obtained by PAN, the
rightwing party.
We start with a standard panel analysis, where the PAN share in
votes is regressed on the share of the section's population that has
been certiﬁed by Procede and the average number of years of being
certiﬁed:
PANSharest ¼ δShareCertifiedst þ μs þ ϑt þ εst ; ð1Þ
PANSharest ¼ δ0 þ δ1YearsCertifiedstð ÞShareCertifiedst þ μs þ ϑt
þ εst ; ð2Þ
for section s and election in year t. ShareCertiﬁed is the fraction of the
section's population that is in a certiﬁed ejido, YearsCertiﬁed is the
(population weighted) average number of years this population has
been certiﬁed, μs and vt are section and time ﬁxed effects, and εst are
error terms clustered at the section level. The section ﬁxed effect con-
trols for time invariant characteristics mentioned in Table 1 such as dis-
tance to city. Time ﬁxed effects control for aggregate time trends in vote
share. Under the condition that the participation rate is the same in the
ejido and non-ejido population (so that the share of the ejido is the
same among voters as it is in the population), and that certiﬁcation of
an ejido does not affect the voting behavior of the other localities in
10 Too few ejidos were certiﬁed between election dates 2006 and 2009 to analyze the
discontinuity at the 2006 election.
Table 2
Technocracy and clientelism in the Procede rollout.
Mean value of
regressor
Date of the information assembly (in months since Jan 1, 1992)
Size Difﬁculty Demand/
opportunity
Poverty Politics Politics All
[st.dev.] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Ejido size and endowment
Members 98.4 0.015*** 0.012** 0.014*** 0.017*** 0.014***
[135.0] (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Total area (100 ha) 0.29 0.009* 0.008 0.001 0.002 0.001
[1.13] (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Share of agricultural land in parcels 0.63 −11.750*** −12.292*** −11.834***
[0.38] (2.18) (2.02) (2.19)
Ratio posesionarios/members 0.23 1.13 1.606** 1.734** 1.594*
[0.86] (0.75) (0.78) (0.79) (0.80)
Conﬂicts
Disputes registered 29 0.028** 0.047*** 0.049*** 0.047***
[46] (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Locality economic opportunities
Distance to nearest city
(pop > 25,000) in kms
34.9 0.043* 0.038* 0.043*
[29.9] (0.021) (0.022) (0.023)
Share non-ag. in occupied population 0.35 −6.960*** −6.788***
[0.26] (2.38) (2.29)
Share of pop. with high school above
median
{0,1} −2.143** −2.118**
(0.87) (0.88)
Locality marginality index −0.23 4.056***
[0.88] (0.92)
Politics — 1991 Federal deputies election results at the municipal level
PRI share 0.69 0.35
[0.13] (4.69)
PAN share 0.10 −15.041**
[0.11] (6.15)
Contested (Difference PRI-PAN
shares ≤ .30)
0.10 −2.836* −0.72
[0.29] (1.39) (1.31)
Alignment with governor's party 0.87 −8.015*** −8.594*** −8.674***
[0.33] (0.93) (1.27) (1.52)
Mean value of dependent variable
(months)
47.3
[36.8]
Observations 24,663 23,495 23,428 21,903 24,346 24,346 23,177
State FE 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%.
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the vote of the ejido population.
Results reported in Table 3, columns 1 and 2, show that certiﬁcation
induced a shift in favor of PAN by 1.46 percentage points, or 6.8% of the
average PAN share, 21.4%, over the whole period. The impact of certiﬁca-
tion increases over time, starting at 0.35 percentage points immediately
after certiﬁcation and growing by 0.27 percentage points per year there-
after, reaching a total of 4.4 percentage points 15 years after certiﬁcation.
A non-parametric estimation of the increasing effect of certiﬁcation over
time conﬁrms the linear trend, at least over the 15-year range of our
observations.
A possible concern for our identiﬁcation strategy is that early certi-
ﬁed ejidos have different voting dynamics than late-certiﬁed ejidos.
Oneway of addressing this concern is to estimate the effects of certiﬁca-
tion in a small window around every election. If the exact date of certi-
ﬁcation is randomdue to factors such as unexpected delays in awarding
certiﬁcates, the treatment is plausibly random around the election date.
Hence, in a regression discontinuity strategy (Imbens and Lemieux,
2008), we use a 3-year window on each side of the election date to
estimate the regression:
PANShares ¼ β0 þ δShareCertifieds þ αShareEjidos þ εs; ð3Þ
where ShareEjidos is the share of the population that belongs to an ejido
in section s. Table 3 columns 3–6 show that by using this strategy we
observe a consistent shift to the right by 1.2 to 2.9 percentage pointsover an average of 12 to 19 percentage points in theﬁrst three elections.
However, the impact on the last group of ejidos that gained certiﬁcation
between 2000 and 2003 is small.10
In the same spirit, we verify in column 7 that this shift to the right
is in fact obtained as soon as the certiﬁcation process is engaged, by con-
trasting ejidos that have had their assembly within 6 months of the
election in 1994, either before or after the election date. This can only
be seen around the 1994 election since the very largemajority of ejidos
had started the certiﬁcation process by the next election. In awindowof
6 months, the impact of having held the ﬁrst assembly that introduced
the certiﬁcation program was already a 1.8 percentage points increase
in the share of PAN.
5.2. Heterogeneity of political responses to certiﬁcation
In this section we investigate the heterogeneity in voting responses
to certiﬁcation by estimating the following model:
PANSharest ¼ δ0 þ δ1Xsð ÞShareCertifiedst þ μs þ ϑt þ εst; ð4Þ
where Xs is a set of structural characteristics of the ejido population in
section s.
Table 4
Heterogeneity of impact on shift to the right and lack of reciprocity to PRI.
PAN share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Share of population titled 0.0146*** 0.0222*** 0.0156*** 0.0235*** 0.0339*** 0.0145***
(0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0035) (0.0042) (0.0028)
Interaction with:
Distance to city (10 kms) −0.00198*** −0.00182***
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Average corn yield (log) 0.00350* 0.002
(0.0018) (0.0019)
Share of corn-bean in crop area −0.0127** −0.0176***
(0.0050) (0.0052)
Share with title granted by PRI 0.00017
(0.0033)
Fixed effects Section & year Section & year Section & year Section & year Section & year Section & year
Observations 113,825 113,825 111,133 111,877 111,133 113,825
Number of sections 19,088 19,088 18,959 18,982 18,959 19,088
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the electoral section level. *** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1.
Table 3
Certiﬁcation induces a shift to the right.
Dependent variable: PAN share
Sample All sections Sections with ﬁrst ejido titled ± 3 years from election Sections with ﬁrst assemby ±
6 months from election
Elections: 1994–2009 1994 election 1997 election 2000 election 2003 election 1994
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Share of population titled 0.0146*** 0.00354* 0.0124*** 0.0231*** 0.0291*** −0.00242
(0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0070) (0.0095)
Share of population with ﬁrst assembly
completed
0.0180***
(0.0055)
Share of population titled* average years
titled
0.00268***
(0.0002)
Share of population in ejidos −0.0542*** −0.0648*** −0.106*** −0.0400*** −0.0555***
(0.0041) (0.0059) (0.0088) (0.0114) (0.0073)
Fixed effects Section & year None None None None None
Observations 113,825 113,825 6222 7316 3902 2246 2376
Electoral sections 19,088 19,088 6222 7316 3902 2246 2376
Mean PAN share 0.214 0.214 0.119 0.158 0.194 0.198 0.112
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the electoral section level in col. 1 and 2. *** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1.
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voting behavior depends on the potential gain in proﬁt to be expected
from acquiring asset ownership. We characterize this potential beneﬁt
by two variables: average land quality and distance to a city. Land qual-
ity in Mexico is frequently measured by corn yield, as corn is the main
staple, grown all over the country. The only systematic measure of
yield we have is at the municipality level, a higher level of administra-
tive unit than either the locality or the section. We use the average corn
yield on rainfed land over the period 2002–2008 as an indicator of land
quality.11 It varies from 0.4 tons/ha (in the lowest decile), to 2.8 tons/ha
(in the highest decile), and 8 tons/ha in the best areas. Distance to a city
of at least 25,000 inhabitants is calculated fromeach locality and averaged
over the section population.
Results reported in Table 4, columns 2 and 3, show that stronger shifts
to the right are associatedwith proximity to a city and land quality. Ejidos
situated 50 kms away from a city have a response half that of ejidos close11 Ideally, we would have used pre-program yields. However, these data were not
collected at the municipality level before 2002. Fortunately, this variable captures
mostly land quality and water availability, which are time invariant to a large extent,
at least over the time period we analyze.to a city. A two-fold increase in yield is associated with an almost 50%
increase in the shift to the right in voting.
Amore accurate speciﬁcation forMexican farmers of vested interests
in voting is the contrast in their exposure to policies championed by the
PRI and the pro-market PAN. One can expect that the shift to the right
would be less important in areas that mostly grow crops such as corn
and beans that have traditionally been strongly supported by the state,
as they may expect losses in support with the pro-market policies of
the right. By contrast, areas growing crops that are left to market forces
(such as export fruits and vegetables) have more to gain from complete
property rights if they are accompanied by pro-market policies. To ana-
lyze this, we use the cropping pattern at the municipal level, and com-
pute the average share of the cropping area dedicated to corn and
beans in 2002–2008. That Mexican agriculture is dominated by corn
and bean is revealed by these numbers. Themean share of land dedicat-
ed to corn and beans is 68%, reaching more than 93% in the 25% most
dedicated municipalities. Results reported in column (4) show that an
increase in land share cultivated in corn and beans of 20 percentage
points is associated with a decline in the shift to the right by almost
11% of the estimated coefﬁcient on population titled.
Putting these interactions together in column (5) shows that the
coefﬁcients of the distance to city and land share in corn and bean
are robust, but not that of corn yield. These associations are thus
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possibility that they reﬂect omitted correlated effects.
5.3. Certiﬁcation is not rewarded by votes
The second land reform created signiﬁcant land security beneﬁts
for 3.5 million certiﬁcate recipients. For the ruling party that initiated
the reform, electoral gains could be expected in return, even though,
as discussed above (Bardhan et al., 2008), reciprocity is less likely
with a one time irreversible transfer such as land certiﬁcation than
with an entitlement to recurrent transfers.
Having established the occurrence of an overall shift to the right
associated with certiﬁcation, a reciprocity-voting behavior could be
deﬁned as a modiﬁcation of the shift to the right. For ejidos granted
certiﬁcation by PAN, reward to the granting party would be additive
to the shift to the right, while it would be mitigating for the ejidos
granted certiﬁcation by PRI. This is analyzed with the estimation of
Eq. (5) in which X is the share of the certiﬁed population that received
its certiﬁcate from PRI. Results reported in column 6 of Table 4 show
no evidence of reciprocity behavior from voters toward the party that
granted them certiﬁcation.
A caveat in this analysis is that the party granting the certiﬁcation
cannot be distinguished from time, since PRI was in power until 2000,
and PAN afterward. Hence one could not separate a trend in the shift
to the right from a differential effect associated with the granting
party. The absence of evidence on reciprocal voting behavior toward
the granting party is conditional on assuming that the shift to the
right is constant over time.
6. Robustness checks
6.1. Can migration explain the shift in voting patterns?
Wenow address the concern that the change in vote share associated
with the change in property rights could be due to selectivemigration. In
another paper (de Janvry et al., 2013), we show that Procede increasedTable 5
Can migration explain the shift in voting patterns?
Rate of change in the
numbers of voters
(since
1994)
(since last
election)
PAN share PAN share PAN share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share of
population
titled
−0.0632*** −0.0228* 0.0146*** 0.0145*** 0.0153***
(0.0166) (0.0133) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0022)
Change in
number of
voters
(in rate, since
1994)
−0.00194
(0.0016)
Change in
number of
voters
(in rate, since
last election)
−0.000321
(0.0003)
Fixed effects Section &
year
Section &
year
Section &
year
Section &
year
Section &
year
Observations 111,865 94,749 113,825 111,853 94,748
Electoral
sections
18,685 19,087 19,088 18,685 19,087
Mean
dependent
variable
0.046 0.080 0.214 0.213 0.232
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the electoral section level. ***
p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1.outmigration. This generates a decrease in the number of voters. If the de-
cision to migrate (or to abstain from voting) were uncorrelated with
voter preferences, this would not affect our results. However, if the deci-
sion to migrate were correlated with voter preferences, our results could
also be explained by a change in the composition of voters, in which
non-PAN voters leave (or abstain) in larger numbers than PAN voters,
rather than an actual shift in preferences towards the right.
We address this possibility by directly controlling for the change in
the number of voters in each election. If the coefﬁcient we estimated
in models (1) and (2) were driven by this effect, then controlling for
the change in voters should affect the estimate of δ in the following
speciﬁcation:
PANSharest ¼ δ ShareCertifiedst þ αΔvotersst þ μs þ ϑt þ εst; ð5Þ
where Δvotersst ¼ Votersst−Voterss;94Voterss;94 or Δvotersst ¼
Votersst−Votersst−1
Votersst−1
:
If the effect of certiﬁcation is to induce a one-time migration and
corresponding change in the number of voters, the best control is the
ﬁrst expression. If, on the other hand, certiﬁcation induces a shift in
the migration rate year after year, then the second expression provides
a better control for the induced change in the number of voters.
The ﬁrst two columns in Table 5 conﬁrm the impact of certiﬁcation
on the number of voters.12Certiﬁcation induces a 6% reduction in voters
on average (col. 1) or a decrease in their 3-year rate of change by 2.3 per-
centage points. However, controlling for the change in the number voters
has virtually no effect on the estimated certiﬁcation coefﬁcient (cols. 4
and 5 compared to col. 3). We can thus conclude that the shift to the
right associated with certiﬁcation was not due to selective migration.
6.2. Validity of the identiﬁcation strategy
Our basic estimating Eq. (1) for the analysis in Section 5 was:
PANSharest ¼ δShareCertifiedst þ μs þ ϑt þ εst ;
where PANSharest is the share of votes received by PAN in section s
and election year t, and ShareCertiﬁedst is the fraction of the section's
population that is in a certiﬁed ejido. Hence the key to identiﬁcation
of a causal impact of certiﬁcation on electoral outcomes is that there
is no time varying unobservable that correlates to both the timing
of the certiﬁcation and the change in voting pattern. In what follows,
we verify the existence of pre-program “parallel trends”, i.e., that the
order or date of the Procede rollout is not correlated with the trends
in voting patterns before the program.
We ﬁrst use the 1991–94 changes in vote share at the municipal
level (the lowest level of aggregation available for the 1991 election)
as the explanatory variable of Procede start and ﬁnish dates. The rollout
is best characterized by the information assembly date, but since the im-
pact we are interested in is certiﬁcation, we run regressions on the dates
of both assemblies. We regress these dates on the change in vote share
received by PRI and PAN in Table 6, columns 1 and 4. Neither coefﬁcient
is statistically signiﬁcant and both are very small. A one standard devia-
tion increase in the change in PAN share is associated with Procede
reaching the ejidos on average less than one month earlier, compared
to an average of 48 months. Results are robust to adding the control vari-
ables that have been found to be associated with the rollout (columns 2
and 5) and to considering non-linear effects of these changes in party
shares (columns 3 and 6).
As a second identiﬁcation test, we report speciﬁcations that are closer
to the estimation equation. These are regressions of changes in vote12 A variable more closely related to the total potential voter population is the num-
ber of registered voters. We only have data on registered voters for the years 2003,
2006, and 2009 (and very few certiﬁcations in 2006 and 2009). However, for that sub-
sample, the coefﬁcient on share titled is equally robust to controlling for voters or reg-
istered voters.
Table 6
Test of exogeneity of the Procede rollout 1991–1994.
Mean value regressor Date of ﬁrst assembly Date of certiﬁcation
[st. dev.] (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Municipal level results for Federal Congress elections
Change in PRI share 1991–94 −0.120 −0.92 −0.75 −1.15 2.88 1.00 −2.24
[0.106] (6.79) (7.94) (8.95) (9.37) (11.05) (11.98)
—— Squared −0.66 −9.62
(20.65) (25.84)
Change in PAN share 1991–94 0.066 −8.17 −1.06 3.88 −9.09 −0.23 4.55
[0.073] (8.03) (8.98) (13.27) (11.87) (11.21) (13.30)
—— Squared −29.12 −30.62
(45.43) (42.64)
Constant 47.74*** 60.46*** 60.41*** 73.82*** 84.01*** 83.96***
(0.93) (5.92) (5.89) (1.15) (6.88) (6.89)
Number of observations 24,346 21,796 21,796 24,359 21,803 21,803
State ﬁxed effects 31 31 31 31 31 31
Controls N Y Y N Y Y
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the state level. *** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1.
Date of assemblies is measured in months since January 1992.
Controls include all variables from Table 2: members, total area, share of ag. land in parcel, ratio posesionarios, disputes, distance to nearest city, share of non-ag. In occupied, above
median high school share, marginality index, PRI share, PAN share, contested, and aligned.
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as a function of the Procede date and of state and election year ﬁxed
effects:
PRISharest−PRIShares;t−1 ¼ βI þ δProcedeDates þ μ Istate þ ϑIt þ εIst
PANSharest−PANShares;t−1 ¼ βA þ δProcedeDates þ μAstate þ ϑAt þ εAst
ð6Þ
for t b ProcedeDates. The section level Procede date, ProcedeDates, indi-
cates the date of the earliest assembly to take place in the section. We
estimated these equations as a SUR system.
Table 7 reports on three windows of pre-program voting results,
1994–97, 1994–2000, and 1994–2003, and correlates the pre-program
changes in vote shares on the date of Procede for the subset of ejidos
that were reached by the program after the later election date. The roll-
out date is never signiﬁcant. In terms of order ofmagnitude, a 10-month
delay in Procede certiﬁcation would be associated with gains or losses
of voting share of 0.02 to 0.18 percent of votes, so the magnitudes are
extremely small.
In conclusion, while we have presented evidence that pre-program
changes in vote shares are uncorrelated to the timing of future program
introduction, as required for identiﬁcation, we should note that anTable 7
Test of exogeneity of the Procede rollout prior to certiﬁcation.
Date of ﬁrst assembly Date of c
(1) (2)
Ejidos with ﬁrst assembly/certiﬁcation date after July 6, 1997
Election to election change in PRI share (%) −0.0049 0.0001
Mean value of dependent variable: −7.2 (0.0126) (0.0067
Election to election change in PAN share (%) 0.0013 0.0022
Mean value of dependent variable: +3.6 (0.0091) (0.0050
Ejidos with ﬁrst assembly/certiﬁcation date after July 2, 2000
Election to election change in PRI share (%) −0.0521* −0.0115
Mean value of dependent variable: −2.9 (0.0247) (0.0105
Election to election change in PAN share (%) −0.0141 0.0029
Mean value of dependent variable: +3.5 (0.0177) (0.0078
Ejidos with ﬁrst assembly/certiﬁcation date after July 6, 2003
Election to election change in PRI share (%) −0.0219 −0.0088
Mean value of dependent variable: −4.4 (0.0768) (0.0295
Election to election change in PAN share (%) −0.0134 −0.0181
Mean value of dependent variable: +3.6 (0.0601) (0.0243
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p b 0.01, ** p b 0.05, * p b 0.1.
Each pair of number comes from a SUR regression of the changes in shares for the two parties
certiﬁcation (col. 2) to take place in the section, with state and time ﬁxed effects, and errors clobservationally equivalent hypothesis is that certiﬁcation was targeted
to places where PANwould gain more support in the future in order for
PRI to compete back those future gains (a reverse causality story). Of
course, in light of the lack of reciprocity results of Section 5.3, this alter-
native explanation is unlikely.
7. Conclusions: The political risks of complete land reform
Following the peasant-led revolution of 1910, Mexico engaged in
an ambitious land reform that gave access to land to 3.5 million house-
holds on more than half of its territory. Property rights granted were
highly incomplete, making household behavior strongly dependent on
state tutelage. Stagnation andpoverty became the norm for the ejido sec-
tor, particularly following the debt crisis and introduction of adjustment
policies that reduced state support to the ejido starting in the late 1980s.
The second land reform initiated in 1992 by the ruling party had the
objective of seeking efﬁciency gains in agriculture by offering peasants
complete property rights, thus freeing them from state tutelage as an in-
termediary to accessing the market.
Using the 14-year rollout of Procede, the land certiﬁcation program,
thatwe showed to be orthogonal to prior trends in electoral support, we
identiﬁed the impact that complete property rights—and the associatedertiﬁcation Number of sections
in columns
Elections Fixed effects (1)/(2)
1994, 1997 State 1890/5030
)
1994, 1997 State
)
1994, 1997, 2000 State, year 603/2298
)
1994, 1997, 2000 State, year
)
1994, 1997, 2000, 2003 State, year 320/1138
)
1994, 1997, 2000, 2003 State, year
)
between two consecutive elections on the month of the ﬁrst assembly (col. 1) or the ﬁrst
ustered at the electoral section level. Observations are at the electoral section level.
225A. de Janvry et al. / Journal of Development Economics 110 (2014) 216–225freedom from state dependency—had on political expression.We found
three major results. First, consistent with the investor class theory, ac-
quisition of ownership induced a conservative shift in electoral choices,
favoring the political party with pro-market (PAN) as opposed to state-
led (PRI) economic policies, thus playing against the interests of the
long standing incumbent party. Second, consistent with the theory as
well, this shift was more pronounced where expected economic gains
from electing a pro-market party were the strongest, not only in
terms of value of the assets received but more speciﬁcally of the degree
ofmarket-dependence of the activities pursuedwith these assets. Third,
consistentwith the theory of distributive politics for one-time irreversible
asset transfers, certiﬁcation failed to induce electorate reciprocity, to the
demise of the ruling party. These results help explain the well-known
puzzle of missing complete land reforms (Warriner, 1969). Through the
Mexican case study, we observed how awidely recognized policy instru-
ment in terms of potential efﬁciency gains—complete land reform—can
fail to pass the test of political feasibility. The evidence presented here
suggests that it is the privilege of pro-market political parties to gain elec-
torally from implementation of complete property rights reforms, even if
land redistribution is a favorite policy platform of pro-state political
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